


# SOCIAL ACTION

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February 15, 1947



## Problems of German Reconstruction

by C. R. CARPENTER

# SOCIAL ACTION Magazine

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# The Churches' Responsibilities

When the allied Foreign Ministers meet in Moscow in March to begin the drafting of a peace treaty with Germany, the importance and complexity of German reconstruction will become more evident than ever. Former Secretary of State Byrnes believed that it might take two years to write this treaty. All are agreed that the most severe test to date of the newly formed United Nations will be what to do with Germany.

The focus of attention from press and platform has usually been on economic and political aspects of reconstruction. In the article that follows Dr. Carpenter deals primarily with what might be called the human aspects of reconstruction. Almost two years have elapsed since V-E Day. In this interim period what has happened to German morale and German social and religious institutions? What progress is being made by the American Army and Military Government in the process of reconstruction?


Reports from Germany on these points are conflicting because the situation itself is confusing. Any honest observer will see both shadows and bright spots in the picture. Predictions about trends are hazardous. The policies of the occupying Powers themselves change in important details from month to month. There is cause for despair about the outcome, yet there are also grounds for hope, warranting heroic effort during the next year or two on the part of all Americans who are associated with this project of reconstruction.

Those of us who have been in Germany recently share Dr. Carpenter's concern about attitudes that are prevalent in the United States. Too few are aware of the near collapse of the whole German economy and the desperate situation this winter from lack of food and fuel. Too many are interested only in the negative aspects of Allied policy relating to punishment and reparations. There is much misplaced worry as to whether American policies are sufficiently severe and whether recovery will come too quickly. What is needed, on the other

hand, is a sober appraisal of the difficulties, internal and external, that we face in this effort at reconstruction and the resources on which we can count.

Dr. Carpenter's analysis as a psychologist of the characteristics of the German people is particularly helpful. There is no assumption here of inborn degeneracy but a sobering portrayal of some of the discouraging factors, such as an underdeveloped capacity for initiative, that have to be taken into account.

At several points the situation in Germany is a direct challenge to American Christians. There is more vitality in the German Church, both Evangelical and Catholic, than is commonly recognized. The passive resistance against Nazi methods and ideology in the churches and in Christian homes was so great that large numbers of teen-age young people were less



Germany is now a country of contrasts. A modern machine of war, the airplane, rises over a wheat field being plowed in ancient manner with horses and plowshare. "Too few are aware of the near collapse of the whole German economy," writes Paul M. Limbert.



infected by the Hitler Youth Movement than we feared. Again, many Christians in Germany are now more informed and realistic in their social outlook and less likely again to be taken in by authoritarian political movements from the right or the left. It is the churches in America that to date have supplied the great bulk of relief from voluntary sources. This material relief must be continued and expanded and at the same time Christians in Germany must be assured that we in America are committed to a positive policy of reconstruction, implemented by a steady stream of competent youth leaders and workers able to give practical aid in rehabilitation.

—PAUL M. LIMBERT\*

## What the Churches Have Said About The Peace Settlement with Germany

*National Study Conference on the Churches and a Just  
and Durable Peace, Cleveland, Ohio, January 16-19, 1945*

In respect to the peace settlement in Europe, we share the following convictions:

The settlement following the war should be inspired by the desire to secure the maximum of collaboration among the peoples of Europe and encourage the economic development of Europe as a whole including Germany. The unilateral determination of boundaries would impair such collaboration. The settlement should insure to the smaller and weaker nations the fullest measure of autonomy consistent with European unity and world organization for peace.

The settlement should make possible the reconciliation of victors and vanquished. That implies that it should remove the power as well as the will of aggressive elements within Germany to make war. However, the necessary discipline of Germany because of the crimes committed in her name should

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\*Paul M. Limbert is President of Springfield College and was a member of the United States Educators Mission to Germany.

not be vindictive. The partition of Germany into separate states should not be imposed upon the German people. The treatment of Germany should be calculated to strengthen the forces within that country committed to liberal civil policies and to international cooperation.

Among the constructive forces upon which a new Germany and a new European concord can be based, the churches are of primary importance. As they have been centers of resistance to tyranny and injustice within Germany and within the occupied countries so they may become a medium through which reconciliation may be accomplished, and through which the process of the re-education and reconstruction of Germany may be carried out in the only way that gives any promise of success—voluntarily from within. The World Council of Churches will greatly aid in the process of reconciliation and reconstruction as the churches of the defeated, the liberated and the victorious nations are brought together into conference and collaboration.

***General Council of the Congregational Christian Churches, Grinnell, Iowa, June 18-25, 1946***

We call upon our churches to help develop public opinion which will restrain the pride and strengthen the responsibility with which the United States exerts its power as a member of the allied nations responsible for the peace treaties. In our judgment, this calls for action which will:

Aim not at vindictive treatment of ex-enemy nations but at their own reconstruction and welfare in relation to the larger society of which they are a part.

Limit reparations to the surplus which ex-enemy nations can produce beyond their requirements for decent living standards.

Provide for the relief of displaced persons, and for orderly and humane policies in any further transfers and resettlement of such groups.



# Problems of German Reconstruction

By C. R. CARPENTER

## *"Town Hall" Forum in Germany*

Hans Weber, a sturdy blond boy of twelve, was among a cluster of his companions centered around an athletic G.I. For two hours on a fine July afternoon Hans had been learning to play baseball with U.S. soldier instructors and equipment. Now he and his playmates were among four hundred boys and girls, ranging in age from eight to fourteen, who flowed into the modernistic auditorium at Bad Kissingen, Germany. A kind of Town Hall forum was being held on the subject: "America and Germany."

Hans was on his feet at the earliest opportunity and asked a question pointedly, but with a sparkle of humor.

"What is a typical meal like in the United States?"


An Air Corps Captain of the discussion panel described a shore diner in Maine and a Pennsylvania Dutch meal. He said

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## The Author

C. R. Carpenter is Professor of Psychology at the Pennsylvania State College. During the war he had a number of important assignments in the Army Air Corps, including personal experience with the problems depicted in this present article. He worked on Air Corps problems of personal adjustments and survival for tropical regions of the world from June, 1943, to June, 1945, and then served with the Army University Program at Biarritz, France, from July, 1945, to March, 1946. He was special projects officer at the Headquarters of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, assigned to research, plans and policies for the part of the Air Corps in the Army Assistance to German Youth Activities from March to September, 1946. During this last assignment, he travelled widely to study youth problems in the American Zone of Occupation, Holland, France and Switzerland.

Captain Carpenter received honorable discharge last Fall, and has returned to his post at Penn State.



that the food habits of people in the United States varied greatly. For example, chicken and rice were favorite dishes in the South, while steaks were more often served in the West and Central States.

The children became restless and exclaimed from time to time as the Captain warmed up to his intriguing subject. Then, Hans clinched his point with another question and the Captain was silenced.

"How do these meals compare with those we German kids have?" (The ration allowed for youths of this age in July, 1946, was theoretically 1700 calories per diem.)

"Next question," invited the Lieutenant moderator.

Hans was on his feet again and he was recognized. The rest of the children were delighted with him.

"Do boys and girls go to school together in the United States?"

A young lady panel member of the American Red Cross Services cautiously explained that the public schools teach both boys and girls, but some private schools have only boys *or* girls.

The follow-up question which Hans asked was a keen thrust at the German Catholic teachers who were seated in a row back of the children.

"Why aren't we boys and girls allowed to attend school together here in Bad Kissingen?"

Laughter spread through the group and many of the children turned to look at the hooded sisters.

### *Hard Questions*

There were other questions which taxed the intelligence, information and diplomatic skills of the panel members. What subjects are taught in the American schools? How do the school systems work? What is the average height of buildings in New York? How is coal mined in Pennsylvania? Why is there so little coal for us in winter? What is being done with the coal of the Ruhr? Most of the questions were answered fully and carefully, but the panel went into a huddle on the last one



and decided that it was not wise to try to explain why a large amount of the reduced volume of coal from the Ruhr was being used to re-establish French industry destroyed by the German occupation.

Was the forum a success? The sponsors, both the Germans and the Americans, believed that it was effective as a means of promoting understanding by the German children about Americans and the way they live. In the minds of some critical observers there were grave doubts. One fact is clear: intelligent kids like Hans Weber and millions of others are asking questions of supreme importance *to them* and they will formulate answers with or without assistance and with or without adequate information.

Their future attitudes and actions will be affected by the answers they formulate. Their actions will largely determine future developments in Germany and in Central Europe.

The scene shifts to Wiesbaden and the living room of a German professor. There a dozen young German men and women, including several ex-prisoners of war, were discussing with two WACS and two G.I. guests the social and political

## BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions which are basic to the viewpoints expressed in this article are:

1. That the German people *can* achieve a form of government which will fit them into the social, economic and cultural pattern of Europe and the world, and thus prevent them from being a continuing threat to world peace.

2. That the reconstruction of Europe as a whole and a world order depend upon the effective readjustments of the German people, because the welfare of other nations is intimately dependent upon a reconstructed Germany.

3. That the Germans cannot achieve economic and social reconstruction within the limits of their own human and natural resources; they must have *proper* assistance and guidance from other peoples.

4. That necessary conditions for Germany's recovery are: (1) acceptance by her people of due responsibilities for the war, and (2) acceptance of maximum responsibilities for solving her own problems of reconstruction.

5. That the United States has the heavy and difficult obligation, which must not be repudiated, of helping to reconstruct a country which she recently has helped defeat in battle.

problems of Germany. The conversation was in English. The professor invited all present to express their ideas freely and to center the discussion on the topic of how Germany is to become a democracy. It was agreed that it would first be necessary for Germans to learn what democracy is and how this form of government actually works. Relatively few Germans know the principles of democracy and fewer still have had actual experiences with the essential processes of democratic living.

### *Can We Demonstrate Democracy in Germany?*

In this meeting an awful challenge was thrown to the guest WACS and soldiers. It is the same challenge that Germany currently presents to all democracies of the world: "Since we as a people lack knowledge of, and experience with, what you call democracy and profess to believe good for yourselves and us, why don't you explain democracy to us? The younger people among us know little of it, and furthermore, we have been thoroughly propagandized *against* this form of government. Finally, can't you show us how democracy works and *demonstrate its operation* and its practicability here in Germany?"

The queries and discussion related to the broad aspects of this challenge, but specific questions also were raised. A former prisoner of war who had received instruction on democratic institutions under the Prisoner of War Reorientation Project asked about the roles and practices of political parties in our system.

"How is it possible," he questioned, "for you Americans to vote a Democratic ticket during one election, a Republican ticket at another time, and split your vote during a third election? This would seem to Germans to be dishonest and indicate a lack of conviction about the involved principles."

One of the WACS answered him: "We tend to vote for the man who, in our opinion, will do the best things in a particular job. Then, too, party platforms, or what parties stand for, change from election to election. Parties in the United States



are supposed to formulate what the people think or believe and get accomplished what they want done."

A young German boy commented that joining a political party in Germany was a most serious step, for one may have to sacrifice much, even life, for that party.

The German host, who had lived in New York, asked why so much inequality and injustice existed in the United States even though we professed to believe in the political equality of men. In reply, the WACS and G.I.'s argued that the large task of applying the *principles of democracy* was only beginning, that these principles were in a sense ideals or goals for



Corp. James W. Bolton, Grandfield, Okla., and Lilo Jansen, Cologne, Germany, look at political posters near the Rhine River in Rudesheim. Although soldiers in the United States Zone of Occupation might exercise a powerful constructive and educational influence, especially on German youth, it is quite clear, says Dr. Carpenter, that this is not happening to the extent that it should.

which we were striving and that the practical attainment of them would require a long time.

A youth who had been silent until now spoke with strong feeling and embarrassed every one present—the other Germans, because he expressed what they felt but dared not say; the Americans, because he spoke regrettable truth.

"I have only seen Americans in Germany, not in the United States. I do not respect them as soldiers, for they are not, from our viewpoint, good soldiers. I do not see in their behavior examples of what I have been told democracy is. Your army and your other organizations here are authoritarian, not democratic. Most of your actions which affect us are arbitrary and not by mutual consent."

After a period of profound silence, a soldier said, "Maybe you are right, but not entirely. We have a special job to do here. The situation in Germany is very abnormal and requires special action—partly military action. Armies the world over are not noted for being democratic. Armies are designed to fight wars, not to govern people."

With one point all agreed: *The situation in Germany is very complex and abnormal.*

As the WACS and soldiers left the professor's discussion group and went to their barracks and the Germans to their so-called homes, what they saw on every hand supported the conclusion: "*The situation in Germany is very complex and abnormal.*"

## Basic Needs in Germany

### *Disruption of Families*

German family life is disrupted. It will be recalled that one objective of the Hitler Youth Movement was that of weakening home influences on boys and girls in order to have them more completely at the service of *The Party*. The effects of war have continued and accentuated this trend. One or both parents have been killed in many families and children and youths



have been forced to shift for themselves, to live with relatives or strangers and to depend on inadequate facilities provided for their care. It was estimated in June, 1946, that about 200,000 homeless youths were on the roads in the American Zone, wandering from place to place and eking out a living as best they could. The shortage of houses in cities and towns has forced many intact families to live under extremely crowded conditions, frequently with strangers. It is reported that even in Wiesbaden, a town only about 15 per cent destroyed, the housing situation equaled two persons to each usable room.

The great majority of German families have had their economic bases cut from under them. Children and youths seek elsewhere for support, with all their personal capacities, intelligence and guile, to secure food, clothing and shelter. Indeed, some parents are forced by dire necessity to send their children to beg, scavenge, or otherwise secure food stuff and other goods, often from U.S. soldiers. The family has been extensively disrupted.

### *Disorganization of Cities*

The principal urban communities have been disorganized. Their population has been greatly disturbed by bombings and by an influx of peoples from other parts of Germany as well as from other countries. Displaced persons and large numbers of people recently released from concentration or prison camps have flowed into the cities. Population centers are aggregations of peoples, rather than organized communities of persons who know and are known by their neighbors.

### *Deficiencies of the Schools*

German schools are not meeting the minimum educational needs. The basic and most important deficiency is the lack of teachers. When the Nazis came into power, many good teachers who refused to comply with Party doctrines were removed from their positions. While the Nazi Party held sway, teachers were forced at least to collect the winter relief funds, and this involved them in active participation in the Party. After the de-

feat of Germany, strict denazification regulations of the Allied Powers required the removal of all active Party participants from teaching positions. An acute shortage of teachers resulted. Finding potential teachers and training them has been an impossible job. Old men and women who taught before the Nazis came to power have been called back to their schools. Inexperienced persons have been employed and are being given on-the-job training. Facilities and personnel for training teachers are in large part lacking. All those who are teaching are being overworked in terms of long hours and the number of students they are required by necessity to handle. It was estimated that in November, 1945, the Land of Württemberg-Baden was 26,000 teachers short of minimum requirements.

### ***Need for Educational Reform***

Ideally, German schools should be drastically reorganized. Traditionally, they have operated without adequate general state support. Equal educational opportunities have not existed for all socio-economic classes. The schools served to maintain the class system and made it extremely difficult for many capable individuals to receive suitable training. Furthermore, students were required to make choices of their careers by the time they were twelve or fourteen years of age and before their abilities and interests had matured sufficiently for making correct choices.

The functions of the schools are too narrow. Educating the whole child or individual is not a general objective of German schools. Many educational needs are left almost entirely to other agencies. Youth activities are most important in this connection. Youth activities and movements function educationally as do many extra-curricular activities in American schools and colleges. The reorganization of German schools might well involve broadening their educational functions to include training for citizenship and social adjustments.

### ***Situation in the Universities***

German universities are limping slowly back into action—



that is, those that were not almost completely destroyed, like the University of Frankfurt. Even such institutions are being opened at this date on a very limited scale. Consider Heidelberg, which was untouched by bombing. About 60 per cent of the faculty who taught there under the Nazi regime has been removed by the application of denazification regulations. Some who remain are from eastern zones of Germany and may be compelled to return to their home places as of 1939. The University's resources are severely limited in relation to demands. Generally, however, great efforts are being made to *reestablish Heidelberg as it was prior to 1933*. This development has the full approval and support of the authorities of the United States Military Government. As far as can be learned, little effort has been made at Heidelberg or at other universities to change the authoritarian class conscious structure of the organization and to introduce democratic instructional and learning procedures into higher education.

Morale among university faculties and students alike is at a low ebb. Professors are uncertain of their status; they are economically and socially insecure. Students are at a loss to know what studies to undertake because of the uncertainties of the future. Many capable and essential persons are debarred from universities. The traditional student songs in the beerless beer gardens of Heidelberg are now replaced by pessimistic mutterings of confused youths.

### ***Outmoded Teaching Materials***

The lack of textbooks, libraries and other informational materials interposes other barriers to German education. The texts that are being used throughout the schools are reprints of books used before Hitler. It has been impossible to secure new and suitable educational materials, although the writing of new texts is being encouraged. Great libraries have been destroyed by Nazi book purges and bombings. Imagine the difficulties which confront both teachers and pupils when it is necessary to use text books published fifteen years ago for courses in history,

geography, and other rapidly changing fields! Furthermore, how is it possible to prepare books in many of the physical and social sciences until basic information is available and until the role of Germany in Europe and the world has been more clearly defined?

The rural and village school buildings have not been seriously damaged, but those of large towns and cities have been extensively destroyed. During the last school year, due to lack of space, school rooms were used in relays by different groups of students who went to school for about two hours each day. Add to this the lack of fuel for heating and another serious hindrance to reestablishment of German schools can be visualized.

### *Condition of the Churches*

The churches, both Catholic and Evangelical, have survived the war and conserved their resources and especially their personnel far better than most other institutions. In meetings of youth leaders, for example, the churches are represented more effectively than are the schools or youth movements. Not only official policy, but also the needs of the people have operated to increase the importance of the churches. Services seem to be well attended and religious institutions are serving important functions for the people, even in politics and political reconstruction. One of Germany's major parties is the Christian Democratic Party. The churches are relatively strong among the contemporary German institutions.

This may seem to be wholly desirable on superficial consideration; however, two important problems should be evaluated:

1. Authority of the churches may not be vested appropriately for fostering the democratization of Germany. Ninety-six per cent of the population in the United States Zone belongs to churches; fifty-three per cent are Catholics and forty-three per cent are Protestants. The hierarchal, authoritarian organization of the Catholic Church is well known. Of the Protestants, a large per cent belong to churches supported by the State. The Allied Powers and the Germans themselves have failed to use the opportunity created by the war for separating the church and state; therefore, the state-supported churches



may become instruments of political control for groups who have power, or for dominant leaders should they arise in the future.

2. Religious influences, beliefs and rituals in the social chaos surrounding the German people may serve as "towers of strength" and stability which will promote realistic social reconstruction and democratization; or, religion may be a means of escape from the complex, difficult world of reality into a world of unrealistic phantasy. Thus, religion may accentuate the introverted, subjective schizoid characteristics of many Germans under stress, or religion may give them super-national and universal perspective of their country and of themselves in relation to other peoples.

### *Individual Needs*

Thus far discussion has centered on the family, community, schools, and churches. Now the perspective is narrowed and focused on individuals and their needs. What possibilities are there for Germans to make personal adjustments?

Clothing is short, but since the Germans were well dressed in comparison to other Europeans in the spring of 1945, basic clothing needs are not as great as with the French or Hollanders, for example. Leather is scarce. An Air Corps General reported that the shoe ration is one pair for a three years' period for each German. Clothes are wearing out far more rapidly than they can be replaced. Attention has already been directed to the related problems of housing and fuel shortages. Certainly by early 1947, it will be impossible for millions of Germans to protect themselves from cold weather and to maintain necessary warmth for work and health.

### *Shortage of Food*

The food shortage is fairly well known. The Potsdam and other agreements require that the living standards of Germans shall be kept to the average level possible for all Europeans, including the British and Russians. Since Germans have been accustomed to a relatively high living standard and have come to expect this, deprivation affects them more seriously than

equal deprivation affects peoples accustomed to a low standard of living. At present, diet allotments are being slowly raised and young boys and girls have always been allowed more calories than adults. During the summer of 1946, an observer of people on the streets would get the impression that German children were better nourished than the other children of Europe, except the Swiss. Present prospects seem to be that before adjustments of food supply can be made, the Germans may suffer as much or more than the peoples they temporarily conquered. The available food supply means that Germans will have a sub-minimal diet for several years to come.

Generally, the Germans believe that they are deprived of



Women care for the potato crop in Berlin's famous park, the Tiergarten, for the capital is still a city of poverty and hunger. Dr. Carpenter points out that in many cities no arrangements were planned or put into effect for requisitioning necessary ground and putting it to use for needed vegetable gardens.

food and other basic commodities as punishment; they are not convinced that this deprivation is a necessity or a means of sharing food with other needy people. They resent the fact that U.S. soldiers have large amounts of food and they react very strongly to conspicuous waste, as well as to rumors of waste of food in army messes. What may be considered slop by mess officers appears as delicious food to a hungry people.

There is now, and will be still more, inequality of food distribution within Germany. The frugal German farmers have much more food than the city people, and the rural peoples are able to barter effectively for other commodities, such as clothes, if they exist. It is reported that a city baron tried to barter his family's silver service with a farmer for eggs and potatoes. The farmer said that he already had all the silver that he wanted, but he requested and got a suit of clothes for twenty eggs and a few potatoes! People who have food seem less inclined to share with the needy than is the case in the United States.

### *Sex Problems*

The socio-sexual problems found in Germany, which directly involve United States soldiers, are widely publicized but are poorly understood. The problems arise from a number of complex conditions, one of the most important of which is the disparate German sex ratio. Conservative estimates indicate that there are at least three girls to two boys in the age range of early maturity. In one town, a count showed a ratio of four young men to nine girls, while in another town the ratio of men to girls was one to five! Millions of German men were killed; millions returned home markedly affected by rigors of war, especially on the Russian front, or they were injured. Millions more are still held as prisoners of war, in concentration camps within and without Germany. There are not enough suitable men available to provide for any kind of a normal balance between the sexes. Hundreds of thousands of girls have few chances to marry and have a home.

It should be remembered, also, that the Nazi regime suc-



ceeded, by training and the provision of adequate rewards and incentives, in raising the birth rate in Germany. This was accomplished, in part, by relaxing the traditional controls which regulate sexual behavior. Thus, compared with standards of society in the United States, sexual morals are very different in Germany today.

### ***Fraternization with American Soldiers***

Considering these factors, it is not surprising that vigorous, well-fed United States soldiers offer attractive possibilities to German girls and women: possibilities for companionship, for much needed food, and for other necessities such as soap, dentifrice, small items of clothing and beauty aids. Furthermore, in the surrounding social and physical disorder, United States soldiers offer them social status and limited security. Even possibilities of marriage are consciously or unconsciously hoped for by many German women—and some soldiers.

The occupation soldiers are easy prey, and they lack perspective on their complex situation. They are away from the social controls of family and community opinions and attitudes. They are often lonesome or sick of the company of other soldiers. They may suffer from the acute disease of most armies of occupation—monotony and boredom. Finally, they are enmeshed in a framework of precedent and tradition which approves behavior that would be considered, in the United States, non-conformist, anti-social or even criminal. To them, "fraternization is a natural." Whereas soldiers in the United States Zone of Occupation should exercise a powerful constructive and educational influence, on German youth especially and on the country and all the people generally, it is quite clear that this is not happening to the extent that it should, although there are exceptions to this generalization.

### ***Unemployment Amid Need***

Unemployment or lack of work is a problem in Germany. Although accurate statistics and reliable estimates are not available, extensive observations confirm this fact. To be sure, there

is much work to be done. Cities and towns need reconstruction. Idle factories and shops should be repaired and put into operation. Millions of man-hours of work should be done on highways, roads and bridges. The farms offer chances for employing large numbers of laborers for constructive improvements and food production. Forest products, so much needed by the people for construction, fuel, and paper, remain unharvested. Yet, thousands of youths and others are neither in school nor effectively employed. It is true that many of these people seem to be busy, but only with the difficult routine tasks of finding food and other day-to-day necessities. Enormous effort is required merely to maintain themselves. For example, a Dutch banker reported that it was less demanding on him formerly to operate a system of banks than to find and secure at present the necessities of life for himself and his wife.

### ***Occupation Policies***

There are many reasons for this condition, but a frozen economy relates directly to the whole situation. The United States authorities are said to have taken very seriously the Potsdam Declaration to destroy or control Germany's industrial war-making potential. All industries which were not absolutely essential were closed down. After surveys and studies, it was planned to reopen and put into operation selected "peaceful" industries. However, once the extensive network of industrial machinery ground to a stop and lay idle with consequent dislocation of materials, personnel and organization, it has been difficult to start the machinery rolling again. The difficulties are accentuated by the fact that the United States Zone is not industrially self-sufficient; products are needed from other zones, but as yet only limited trade is allowed to flow across the zonal boundaries established by the Allied Powers. These conditions help to explain unemployment, as well as the lack of required food stuff, clothing and shelter.

### ***Need for a Positive Policy***

Although the economic dislocations in the United States

Zone are basic obstructions to a minimal recovery and social reconstruction, the difficulties in this field should not be used as rationalizations, or as excuses for not accomplishing the solution of many problems which can be solved within the resources of zonal limits. Take the problem of food for an example. In the spring of 1946, agricultural experts of the Office of Military Government working with German Civil Government in local communities fostered a gardening program. Plots of ground located in or near dense centers of population were needed. But the land belonged to private individuals and no arrangement was planned or put into effect for requisitioning necessary ground and putting it to use for vegetable gardening.

It is a truism that men cannot work without adequate food. Twelve, fifteen or eighteen hundred calories are not adequate for a laborer. But if the labor potential in Germany were properly organized and focused on meeting primary needs for food, clothing, shelter, transport and communication, much could be accomplished to satisfy these needs. The absurd situation of having extensive unemployment in the midst of great and urgent demands for labor could be corrected to a considerable degree. Constructive work would, furthermore, decisively improve German morale, especially among the younger people, and would provide desirable training in work skills and in community life.

## The Psychology of the People

German cultural processes have fostered philosophic and theoretical thinking in the educated people. They seem to be dependent upon broad generalized concepts. This is demonstrated in meetings of German youth leaders. Invariably the comments and formal little lectures—they do not know how to participate in give-and-take discussion—are highly abstract and theoretical.



### *Destruction of Former Doctrines*

The generalizations and doctrines which made up Nazi ideology, as well as segments of other Germanic philosophies, have been made untenable or taboo by defeat and by regulations now in effect. For millions of Germans, Nazism and related doctrines previously provided the theoretical framework which is seemingly so necessary to German thought processes and value systems. Since these cannot now be accepted, or if accepted cannot be openly expressed and used, a void exists and constructive thinking is difficult or impossible. Therefore, there is an urgent need to fill this void with sound principles of political philosophy and practical viewpoints for social reconstruction. This requirement imposes a heavy task on general, including adult, education.

"The logic of events" makes it necessary for Germans to re-examine the previously acceptable concept of the "master race" and "Nordic superiority". The failure of Nazi leaders to fulfill their promises has raised serious doubts about the "führer principle", even though the dependence on direction from authorities remains as a trait of German character. Class distinctions are now untenable under severe conditions where upper classes are forced to live on the same plane with common labor, or even below the living standards of rural peoples. The needs of individuals are compelling; and the *State* for which Germans sacrificed so much no longer exists in reality. The principle of dominance by force as an instrument of social control is being applied *to them now*, and they may well view and consider the injustices of force as a means of social control. All these and other cross-currents and conflicts in the streams of Germanic thought create needs for new principles and viewpoints, for acceptable meanings and philosophy.

### *Refusal to Accept Blame*

The Germans are finding answers to their questions, but, lacking substantial evidence and facts properly presented, many of their attitudes and thoughts are misconceptions asso-

ciated with strong emotions. In the first place, they generally resist considering or stubbornly refuse to accept a proportionate degree of blame, guilt or responsibility for the war and its effects. This heavy and intolerable burden is *displaced* or directed away from themselves to their previously esteemed leaders who are dead, to general economic and social forces, and to other nations. They even blame the United States for failing to intervene in the internal affairs of Germany and for not stopping Hitler and his colleagues before they had achieved full power. They feel pity for themselves, and refuse to think of possible comparisons between their present plight and the enforced suffering of Hollanders, Belgians, French, British, and Russians. Most of the people regret the loss of the war but do not seriously regret Germany's part in its perpetration. A few who accept these heavy burdens of responsibility find the psychological load intolerable and commit suicide.

## ESSAY CONTEST

German boys and girls in Bad Kissingen were asked recently to write a 100-word essay on "Why Are the Americans in Germany?" The contest was sponsored by the local German youth activities office of the 12th Tactical Air Force headquarters. While relatively few of the children, aged 10 to 15, expressed hostility to the Americans—the prizes were candy bars—the letters revealed several interesting aspects of the political orientation of German youth and their parents. Several basic themes dominated their thinking, the letters showed.

"The Americans are in Germany to liberate us, to form a democratic state, to root out the Nazis. All this is right, but why are they wasting so much food?"

"They don't want to have the Russians occupying all of Europe. The Americans want to save Germany."

"After the capitulation, Germany was without a leader, and because of this the conquerors helped us and for that reason the Americans are in Germany."

"The Americans are in Germany to keep the Germans poor, and to prevent their science and culture from recovering."

"I am here to do my duty, as an American soldier has to do for God, his country and democracy, with its freedoms and rights for men." So would an American soldier say it short and sweet. He certainly would not need a hundred words to answer this question."

—*New York Herald Tribune*  
November 10, 1946

### *Americans Are the New Scapegoats*

Americans in the United States Zone of Occupation serve as convenient scapegoats for all personal difficulties and social problems. In spite of the cardinal principle of Military Government authorities—to give the maximum possible responsibility for all civil affairs to the Germans—Americans are blamed for food shortages, lack of housing, inadequacies of transport, ineffective schools, unemployment and even the high rate of venereal diseases. In addition, the average German heavily discounts the enormous efforts made by United States military forces and military government to promote the economic and social reconstruction of Germany.

Generally the presence and policies of United States military forces are rather strongly resented by the Germans. Yet these same people are very dependent on these forces. Those individuals who work for and cooperate with American personnel and organizations have committed themselves, often by force of economic necessity, as collaborators with Americans. It is certainly possible that widespread fear prevails for their personal safety and status when the occupation authorities and forces are withdrawn from Germany. Even now they may experience the hostility of many Germans. After all, Germans know what collaboration meant during the war in Holland, in France, and in Belgium. Furthermore, extensive fear exists about the possibilities of radical forms of government or even revolution prevailing in Germany during the period immediately following the withdrawal of American forces. The people know that they will need greater protection from Occupation Forces should a European crisis develop.

### *Lack of German Initiative*

That the Germans are not showing the necessary initiative for getting under way the enormous job of reconstruction is a fact confirmed by all capable observers in Germany. Two complex attitudes, the failure to accept due responsibility for the war and its effects and the attribution of blame to other sources,



indicate the *imperative necessity* that the German people, especially the youth, accept responsibility and take the initiative for their own problems of reconstruction. But Germans generally are accustomed to having direction and orders from superior authorities. Individuals and small groups have usually been enmeshed in a framework of social patterns and of rules and regulations; initiative, both local and individual, has not been adequately encouraged. In order to act in groups on social problems, Germans seem to need direction from authorities and organizations, the higher and the larger the better.

Another set of causes for lack of initiative lies with the numerous and complex reconstruction demands. It is difficult to know where to begin, what problems to solve first, especially when elemental personal needs to support life insistently demand attention and expenditure of available energy. Further, lack of initiative may be due partly to the accumulating deficit of energy resulting from insufficient diet. Experiments on deficient diets show that subjects on starvation diets have marked reduction in their interests, ambitions and general motivation for action. A problem of first magnitude in human engineering is that of motivating the German people to speed up the work of reconstructing their own country and to help in the reconstruction of other war devastated areas of Europe.

### *Prevailing Mood of Uncertainty*

A phase of the psychology of the German people which deserves attention in this connection is their lack of hope for the future. To them the future is dark. Older people remark that they and their generation are finished. They often add, "Now, it's up to the young people." But the young people do not know how to plan their lives, nor can they imagine what to expect in the future. Selecting a profession or line of work presents an almost impossible decision for many. They do not have vocational guidance services, nor do they know what the needs or demands will be for semi-skilled, skilled and professional

workers. Likewise, planning for marriage and a home is equally as difficult as selecting a vocation.

Not only do Germans find it impossible to anticipate what lies ahead of them personally, but they have only vague apprehensions of what the future will be for Germany. This state of mind will persist until the Allied Powers write a peace treaty for Germany and make clear and understandable to all Germans exactly what will be demanded of her, and make explicit what Germany must do to earn a place in the world order. This will not necessarily give Germany a good blue print of her future, though a clear statement will be very helpful in decreasing confusion. Many social and economic events, over which no established authorities have jurisdiction, must grow out of the postwar chaos and determine for Germany her role in the affairs of Europe and the world.

### *Emotional Approach to Problems*

What is the sum of all these conditions? German youths and the German people are confused, disillusioned and frustrated. They have lost considerable confidence in their leadership and their institutions. Some resist appeals which are made to them by political parties, labor groups, the churches, and youth organizations. Some of the most intelligent young people say, in effect, "Leave us alone. We want to think through this situation for ourselves. We are not ready yet to commit ourselves to a course of action. Leave us alone!" In many ways this is a healthy attitude, especially if independent, vigorous and thoughtful analyses of problems could be expected from the deliberations of Germans. It is improbable that this desirable result will follow. Germans have been so effectively spoon-fed on Nazi doctrines for so long that they lack the necessary information, facts and principles for thinking through problematical situations. They cannot deal effectively with personal-social problems because they lack the necessary framework of knowledge and experience. Furthermore, German youths especially have formed, as a result of traditional viewpoints and Nazi

influences, highly charged emotionalized attitudes which stereotype their thoughts and actions. Their deep-seated prejudices and beliefs prevent logical, just and objective thinking about current problems. Objective analysis of their problems by Germans will require special conditions and guidance, because of their dependence upon organizations, social movements and ideologies.

### *Youth Organizations As Ends, Not Means*

Observations of German youths and their leaders suggest that for them *The Organization* is viewed as an *end in itself*, rather than as a *means* of accomplishing desirable social action and of satisfying social needs. Thus, large organizations may be established without clear realization of the functions they are designed to serve. These groups are, in turn, vulnerable to domination and control by a forceful leader who can give them an ideology and a purpose.

### LONG ROAD AHEAD

Youth discussion groups sponsored by the American Military Government to foster a democratic spirit in Germany still have a long, hard road to travel before young Germans even comprehend the meaning of freedom or democracy, otherwise than as theoretical concepts, to judge from a typical meeting I attended yesterday.

This group was about 50 per cent German and 50 per cent American. Evidently full of good-will, the members argued vehemently but generally in the field of abstract ideas and rhetorical profundities, without ever arriving at a common ground for discussion.

The topic itself—"What is a German"—was rather on the meta-physical side, but the discussion that followed was even more so. The Germans frequently while decrying dictatorship and denying Germans are different from anyone else, conclude remarks with: "One who is not a German cannot understand this," or: "That is not in the German character." On the other hand, the young Americans did not help the situation by betraying only the most elementary comprehension of the problem under discussion and prefacing all their remarks with reference to "back home."

The general impression was that the old "Sturm und Drang" spirit was almost totally absent, perhaps because of the long totalitarian indoctrination of the German nation, and that the Americans were in the main of little help in this respect because their own liberties had never been seriously endangered.

—Delbert Clark  
*New York Times*  
December 16, 1946



## A Program for Germany

Germans are disillusioned, frustrated and confused. It is not reasonable to expect them to make effective adjustments without some help and guidance by other peoples. A man cannot lift himself by his own boot straps, especially when the straps have been removed from the boots.

### *Some Favorable Conditions*

The situation is gloomy but there are aspects which offer hope. Human organisms have enormous recuperative powers and the twenty-odd millions of Germans in the United States Zone have at least an average amount of these powers. In the midst of destruction and social disorganization there are signs of renewed vitality in the areas of government, political parties, labor groups, youth activities, theatre, arts, and agriculture. Furthermore, the shock of war and defeat, the destruction and social disorganization, provide a necessary condition, a kind of shock treatment, for social change and reconstruction of the German system. Opportunities for social changes have been created by defeat. However, psychiatrists know that shock treatment does not cure a patient. It does provide a condition favorable for therapy; a healthful readjustment depends on subsequent therapeutic procedures. The German people have had the shock treatment. Now they need reeducation and readjustment. Who is to function as a psychiatrist? The problems are exceedingly complex but they can be solved; they *must be solved* unless the fruits of victory are to be lost in chaos in Central Europe.

### *The U.S. Is Committed*

Theoretically, the United States might withdraw from the whole German situation—and thereby risk the loss of the enormous investments of money, time and life which have been made in World Wars I and II. But the choice of whether or not to participate actively in the reconstruction and democrati-

zation of Germany has already been made for the forces of the United States and her people. This great responsibility has been officially defined by the Allied Powers. The representatives of the United States have committed the people of this nation to the acceptance of a due proportion of that responsibility. Withdrawal or failure would be disastrous to the prestige of the United States and to her position in the world.

### *The Potsdam Declaration*

The Potsdam Declaration, which is the current basis of policy regarding Germany, provides, among other things, that:

The purposes of the occupation of Germany shall be: a. completely to disarm and demilitarize Germany. b. To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought



Here is an aerial view of part of the blasted war factories of Germany. The United States authorities took seriously the Potsdam declaration to destroy or control Germany's industrial war-making potential, writes Dr. Carpenter. Once the extensive network of industrial equipment came to a stop and lay idle a while, it has been difficult to start the machinery rolling again.

upon themselves. c. To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis. d. To educate and control the German people so as to eliminate completely Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. e. To administer affairs in Germany in such a manner as to decentralize the political structure and to develop local responsibility.

The Declaration specifies, furthermore, that the judicial system shall be reorganized in accordance with principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press, and religion shall be permitted and religious institutions shall be respected.

### ***Failure to Apply Policies***

A most frequently stated complaint of United States personnel in the Zone of Occupation is that there are no clear cut policies to guide action. This is not true. The Potsdam Declaration has established an authoritative framework of general policies and at the same time committed United States Forces to carry them out. Statements to the effect that policies do not exist must be interpreted as excuses for ineffective action or as an indication of gross ignorance of established policies. Furthermore, lack of agreement among the Allied Powers on some general problems (such as trade from one zone to another and economic unification), or the need for revision of the Potsdam Declaration in view of developments, is no just excuse for failure to implement policies and plans which have been approved by responsible authorities and need no changes. The difficulty is not that policies are lacking; the difficulty is that the practical implementation of existent policies is proceeding too slowly and too ineffectively. It is not true that officials do not know what should be done; rather, what is known is not being effectively applied.

### ***Why American Occupation Fails***

Why is this the case? 1. Within the limits of available personal and economic resources, the German people are seem-



ingly incapable of discharging their primary responsibilities for reconstruction. 2. The Office of Military Government has not fulfilled its responsibilities; enough men of the right quality were not trained and assigned to OMG positions; much trained personnel was released from service before its job was done. (Many were released after long training periods and relatively short periods of effective foreign service.) 3. The United States State Department was incapable of performing Military Government functions in Germany, because of lack of funds and of congressional approval. Thus, it became a necessity for the Military Forces to carry a heavy responsibility of work for which military men are not effectively trained. 4. The lack of a realization by the American people of the importance of the job yet to be done in Germany, and the consequent lack of interest in and support for work in the Zone of Occupation, has seriously handicapped the complex operations.

All of these factors are important, but in most cases the critical shortage is that of men capable of discharging the heavy responsibilities involved. This applies to both military and civilian personnel. In this connection, however, caution should be exercised; there are men in Germany who, against great odds and under extremely grave difficulties, are doing their jobs well without the interest and support which they deserve from the people of the United States and without the full cooperation of their colleagues, even superiors, in the Zone of Occupation.

### *The Responsibility of American Citizens*

What practical actions can be taken by the people at home?

An American citizenry intelligently informed on the problems and issues in Germany is the first essential prerequisite. The people should realize what is at stake—what *they* have at stake—in Germany and should develop commensurate interest in the situation and information about it. The United States may be losing the very things for which two wars have been fought.

It is realized that great difficulties are involved in getting reliable and comprehensive facts about the situation in Germany. The reading public should insist that newspapers, magazines and news services which have capable reporters in Germany shall use these persons to describe effectively and fully the events which relate to *basic issues*, as well as to report "spot news". In the spring of 1946, editors and managers of periodicals severely reduced the space allotments of reporters from Germany, because, they said, "The people at home are not interested and will not read the stories unless they have 'news value'."

For example, everyone knows about the Kroenberg jewel theft, but few Americans are informed of the progress being made in securing a new constitution for the three states in the American Zone. Few know of the substantial progress which has been made in developing *in form* a democratic local government. Few know about the extensive work of the army in assisting German youth activities. These important developments have apparently little "news value" for the press at home, because of an indifferent reading public and of reading habits which favor the sensational and are absorbed in problems of internal affairs.

### *Support Representatives in Germany*

The people of the United States can support our representatives in Germany. Our army, military government, and civilian employees in Germany are keenly aware of the lack of interest and support. They believe that their work is not understood, appreciated, or properly evaluated. These attitudes importantly affect their morale and their working efficiency. With the exception of regular Army men, many of the others think that they are losing professional and economic opportunities back home. Even so soon after the military victory, they feel that they are *forgotten men* with uncertain futures. They cannot depend on their work in Germany being properly recognized as career achievements on which they can build when they re-

turn to this country to enter either private employment or public service. Thus, qualified men who are almost indispensable in Germany return home, even though they are well paid abroad, and it is extremely difficult to interest qualified personnel to replace them and to fill other responsible job vacancies.

### ***Demand Sound, Democratic Administration***

An informed U.S. citizenry can bring pressures to bear on our government, State Department, and War Department, toward formulating sound plans, if others are needed, and effectively implementing all policies. There are no places in Germany for figureheads in responsible positions. There is no excuse for restrictions on information about the real state of affairs in the American Zone. No excuses should be accepted for failure to carry out important and necessary plans for which adequate personnel and resources already exist in Europe. Neither military rank nor civil service ratings should protect a man who fails to discharge effectively his responsibilities. There seems to be no sufficient basis for keeping the aid of American civilian or voluntary organizations from the German people, and for refusing or not securing available aid from people at home in solving urgent problems of reconstruction. There is no justification for processes of social or organizational control which do not represent, as effectively as possible, the democratic principles which we propose to preach to the Germans. There is no excuse for sending either military personnel or civilians to Germany without first thoroughly informing them about the general objectives, the overall mission, which they must help accomplish. Neither should men be sent who lack capabilities and training for their *specific* jobs. If these and other errors are discovered, the force of public opinion should be brought to bear without delay to correct them.

### ***Other Tasks for Citizens***

United States citizens can help in the enormous task of social reconstruction of Germany in many ways, even through the



narrow and tortuous channels which are now established. Food and clothing can be sent through CARE\* and other agencies. Books, magazines, films and other informational materials can be collected, shipped, and, if due attention is given to practical means of doing so, distributed. Arrangements can be made for free discussion with Germans about common social problems. Every opportunity should be used, and opportunities should be created, for teaching the Germans about democracy and demonstrating how its principles may work in practice. The American people and their institutions should anticipate, furthermore, the time when thousands of young Germans may come to the United States for training and reorientation preparatory for reconstruction work in Germany. This is the only way that some phases of reeducation can be accomplished. All these and other forms of practical action should be undertaken.

### *Steps for the Government*

What practical actions should be taken by those men responsible for the operations in Germany?

1. The Government should settle at once and definitely the problems of the division of labor as between the Department of State and the Department of War. Assignment of appropriate functions should be made to each Department, and military authorities should be relieved of duties which no army, however efficient, well manned, and well organized, should be expected to perform.

### *Recruitment of Personnel*

2. Necessary actions should be taken by both the State and War Departments to recruit, select and train, in sufficient numbers, men and women especially qualified for work in the Army of Occupation and for Civil Service positions. Rigorous job requirements, closely integrated with the over-all mission, should be established and strictly enforced. No persons should

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\*For specific instructions, address Cooperative for American Remittance to Europe (CARE), 50 Broad Street, New York 4, N. Y.

be sent, or allowed to remain, in Germany merely to fill vacancies in tables of organization. The Army practice of sending personnel to the European Theatre of Operations (ETO) on "tours of duty" without regard to the qualifications and suitability of these men should be stopped immediately. On the other hand, all vacancies in necessary positions should be filled. The United States has the men and the brain power. The problem is to recruit, train and apply this power to the jobs to be done. The Army would not send weak and untrained personnel of any grade or rank into a crucial battle; neither should the Army send improperly selected and untrained men to work on the very crucial problems in Germany, for Germany has become a proving ground of nations.

### ***Training of Personnel***

3. Every person employed by the United States Government, including military personnel, should be led to accept due responsibility for adequately representing the United States, for helping educate the Germans and for assisting in the work of social reconstruction. This requires an emphasis on training, information and education commensurate with the emphasis placed on these functions during actual war. However, the training and indoctrination work must be planned to accomplish the objectives of the occupation and not of a military campaign. (Films which were designed, produced and used effectively to lead men to want to fight the Germans are still being used in orientation (disorientation?) programs for the United States Forces of Occupation!)

4. Class and caste distinctions and privileges among American military and civilian personnel in Germany should be reduced to an absolute minimum. Civilian and dependent communities particularly should be organized as *models of democratic living*, instead of examples of totalitarian, authoritarian hierarchies based on rank, position and privilege.

### ***Better Conduct for Our Soldiers***

5. It is imperative that the standards of conduct of our

troops in the Zone of Occupation be raised. This can be done by the selection of fit personnel, by rigorously training them, by strict discipline and by insistence on devotion to clearly explained duties. To accomplish the needed improvement in standards of conduct is difficult, but not impossible even in a socio-cultural situation where behavior norms and requirements are greatly confused and where the predispositions and needs of millions of Germans and thousands of Americans lead toward low moral standards.

6. Necessary action should be taken to raise and then maintain the prestige of the United States Forces of Occupation to that level achieved by our fighting men during the war. Our prestige must rest on accomplishing the difficult tasks of helping to police, control, educate and reconstruct a defeated Germany.

7. Conspicuous display of materials and waste of supplies, goods and food should be reduced to an absolute minimum.

### *Toward a Democratic Germany*

Hans Weber must be encouraged to ask, freely and without fear, more questions than he is now asking, along with millions of others like him. The economic, social and political situation should be made favorable for encouraging Hans to seek answers to all questions. He should be given information which will aid him, without prejudice, to find the *right* answers to his questions. He should be given the chance to learn new principles for guiding his thinking and for solving his problems. He must be encouraged to *act* and to test the correctness of his actions as he learns to apply universally approved democratic principles—not merely American versions—to the building of a unique and democratic Germany, a new member of the United Nations.

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#### GOOD READING:

*Report of the United States Educators Mission to Germany in the Summer of 1946*, under auspices of the Department of State and the War Department. Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. 15 cents.



# The Reader Writes

*Contributions to this department, a regular feature of the magazine, will be welcomed. Unless it is specified otherwise, any communications addressed to the Editors will be considered available for publication. Letters should be brief, and the Editors reserve the right to omit portions without changing the sense. Unsigned letters will not be published, except where anonymity is obviously warranted. Address communications to the Editors, 409 Prospect Street, New Haven 11, Connecticut.*

## Social Action School

Sirs:

We have theological seminaries and ministerial schools, but they seldom, if at all, devote any time to social action. We have ministers and lay leaders who are immensely interested in social action, but they have no source of intensive training. There are many young men and women graduating from college who would devote their lives to social action, but there is no place where they may go for further inspiration and training.

It is therefore proposed that we found a School for Social Action, which would be directly affiliated with the Council for Social Action of the Congregational-Christian Churches. Here is an opportunity for us to take the lead among all denominations.

Such a school, in addition to having a faculty and regular student body, would organize and conduct conferences on social action for ministers and lay church workers. It would maintain an experimental attitude toward social action. It should prepare leadership material which might be useful to those who could not attend in person.

Assuming that the idea of a School for Social Action is a sound one, the

next question is, where to locate it? Obviously, we should avail ourselves of any facilities now part and parcel of this denomination. We should if possible affiliate with a school which already has a faculty interested in the subject. We should seek a school which has ample housing facilities. And it should be in an area where there is evident need for social action.

We, at Southern Union College, feel that we are the logical ones to participate in the founding of such a school and carry on its work for the denomination. We have an interested faculty; we have the housing facilities; and we are in need of social action. Furthermore, we are already underway with our School for Social Studies and Action.

Homer Fahrner

Director, School for Social  
Studies and Action  
Southern Union College  
Wadley, Alabama

## Money and Christianity

Sirs:

I am impressed in visiting churches throughout the land that they do not understand better how very essential and necessary a part of Christianity is social action. I feel that in order for Christian social action to be ef-

fective it should really start from the grass roots and should be more adequately financed. I see no reason why wealthy people would not be interested in having their money work through social action as, for instance, Filene was interested in seeing part of his money promote cooperatives.

A. H. Packard

President, Vermont State Farm  
Bureau, Burlington, Vermont

## Clear and Fair

Sirs:

Permit me to congratulate *Social Action* for publishing, and Dr. Lindeman for writing the extremely clear, fair and thought-provoking article "In What Direction is America Moving." It should be read by everyone whether he is on the left or the right side of the fence or balanced on top of it.

Richmond Page

Editor, *Economic Affairs*  
Institute of Economic Affairs  
New York University

## Montana Politics

Sirs:

Being a sometime resident of Montana, and knowing a thing or two about it, I find Mr. John F. C. Green's letter in the November 15th issue much too simple and rather nonsensical semantically speaking.

He equates worthwhile citizens with those who voted for Wheeler, and all others are "ultra-left-wingers." Mr. Green evidently approves of Wheeler. I, too, think he did many splendid things in Washington as Senator. Probably most Montanans will approve of one or another piece of work Wheeler has done. Still he was defeated by a substantial majority in the primary.

Mr. Green's suggestion that all the worthwhile citizens voted for Wheeler and all the worthless citizens voted against him is rather

naive. Would he suggest that worthwhile citizens be given two or three votes, and the worthless ones one vote? His suggestion that money defeated Wheeler is too simple also. Anaconda Copper company favored Wheeler. Who else in Montana spends money on elections? . . . Company support is more apt to be the "kiss of death" than a ticket to Washington.

Montana politics are more complex than any simple "worthwhile citizens" versus "ultra-left-wing rabble." It is compounded of Orange and Green Irishmen and the color loyalties; of Irish and Cornish antipathies; of Protestant and Roman Catholic mutual distrust; of the rural-urban conflict; and of Big Business and the people; union and anti-union loyalties. These are the underlying emotions and their intermixture is sometimes baffling.

So long as the "rabble" is the majority, Mr. Green's value judgment on "worthwhile citizens" is meaningless politically speaking.

Mr. Green also seems to suggest that the "rabble" should have been shot. Is this the height of noble thinking of the "worthwhile citizenry?"

Emerson W. Harris

Minister, First Congregational  
Church, Eureka, California

### Best Sermons

G. Paul Butler, editor of the *Best Sermons* series published by Harpers, is searching for good sermons on both personal and social gospel themes and delivered between October 1, 1945 and December 31, 1946. The 52 best sermons submitted to him will be published in the 1947-48 edition of *Best Sermons*. Send manuscripts to G. Paul Butler, 431 Riverside Drive, New York 25, N. Y.



## Social Scene

A U.S. Army nurse in the European Theatre of Operations writes, "We must begin with the children. There is still too much resentment of us by adults." Her letter describes the Christmas parties that all American installations were to put on for German youngsters as part of their Youth Education plan.

The hurts and hates of a defeated people, to say nothing of a victorious nation, are such that it is hard to heal the minds of the adult generation. Any effective program of re-education must begin with the teaching and practice of democracy among the school children, fortified with food for the famished and shoes for the unshod. "Fraternization" could become a soldier-operated program to found a feeling of goodwill that would net peaceable results in generations yet to come. Such a program must be furnished with an intelligent ideology and a humane intent—and a resolute determination not to profit by black-markets.

Yes, begin with the children abroad. And at home a few adults could do with some reeducation, too.

Alfred W. Swan



"We must begin with the children"—a primary school opened by the Allied Military Government in Aachen, Germany.